Can science determine the presence of free will?

[Floppit]

So here goes...

For a definition of free will I quite like Answer.com's:

The ability or discretion to choose; free choice: chose to remain behind of my own free will.
The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.


The level of free will we have has been knocking around as a question in psychology since I can remember. Zimbardo and his prison experiment ( http://www.prisonexp.org/ ) was often used to suggest that even extreme behaviour was so easily manipulated by groups and social setting that it challenged the notion of individual free will. The same argument recurred regarding Milgram's ( http://www.cba.uri.edu/Faculty/dellabitta/mr415s98/EthicEtcLinks/Milgram.htm ) and Asch's ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6LH10-3H8k ) work into conformity. That's at one level, but it can go alot deeper into biology - can a brain damaged person be held responsible for their actions if (for example) the executive function area of the brain has been knocked out?

In terms of the actual question whether we truly have individual free will, personally I think it's a matter of degree. I choose what I wear each morning BUT as individual as I might think myself I don't wear 18th century costume, I actually conform. I also can't help but observe that non conformists have to be amongst the most loyal of uniform wearers!

But that's not what I'm asking here - I'm not asking if we have free will. My question is whether the existance of individual free will can be answered by science at all.

I hope it's not too bad mannered for me to ommit my own view for now - I will throw my hat into the ring but I think this works better as just a question to start with.

[Mulder]

You might need to define free will a bit more concisely.

For instance, most decisions we make come from the unconscious part of our brain. Our consciousness finds out about slightly later. For instance, what we perceive is made up partly from sensory input and partly from memory. What we finally perceive can be influenced by suggestion and experience. The unconscious part of our brain 'decides' what we perceive without conscious intervention. Cultural influences can make us 'see' a flying saucer which is really Venus.

Further, some 'decisions' (like getting out of the way of an approaching object) are reflexes which happen without the brain being involved at all.

So does 'free will' require conscious intervention?

[Floppit]

From the Cambridge dictionary:


free will noun [U]
the ability to decide what to do independently of any outside influence:
No one told me to do it - I did it of my own free will.

From MSN Encarta:

Free Will:
Power or ability of the human mind to choose a course of action or make a decision without being subject to restraints imposed by antecedent causes, by necessity, or by divine predetermination.



Take your pick - I'm happy with any of the above but not for a lengthy debate on whether the dictionaries need re writing.

[DrS]

I'm not sure science could determine something that really could be defined as no more than a lack of external constraint, whether external in the sense of physical compulsion or divine requirement ... :undecided:

[Floppit]

Scientists are trying, although trying is different to succeeding!



Consciousness and Cognition (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/10538100)
Volume 17, Issue 3 (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%236752%232008%23999829996%23694336% 23FLA%23&_cdi=6752&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=593670b17fd070a57643217671b0f8f9), September 2008, Pages 587-601
Neuronal correlates of “free will” are associated with regional specialization in the human intrinsic/default network
Ilan Goldberga (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6WD0-4RD9FFW-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=27bfa8ab76db55e3e08b9a5c99a0d63c#aff1), Shimon Ullmanc (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6WD0-4RD9FFW-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=27bfa8ab76db55e3e08b9a5c99a0d63c#aff3) and Rafael Malachb (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6WD0-4RD9FFW-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=27bfa8ab76db55e3e08b9a5c99a0d63c#aff2), http://www.sciencedirect.com/scidirimg/entities/REcor.gif (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6WD0-4RD9FFW-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=27bfa8ab76db55e3e08b9a5c99a0d63c#cor1), http://www.sciencedirect.com/scidirimg/entities/REemail.gif (rafi.malach@weizmann.ac.il)
aDepartment of Neurology, Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center, 6 Weizmann Street, Tel-Aviv 64239, Israel
bDepartment of Neurobiology, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot 76100, Israel
cDepartment of Computer Science and Mathematics, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot 76100, Israel



Received 10 April 2007.
Available online 21 December 2007.

Abstract

Recently, we proposed a fundamental subdivision of the human cortex into two complementary networks—an “extrinsic” one which deals with the external environment, and an “intrinsic” one which largely overlaps with the “default mode” system, and deals with internally oriented and endogenous mental processes. Here we tested this hypothesis by contrasting decision making under external and internally-derived conditions. Subjects were presented with an external cue, and were required to either follow an external instruction (“determined” condition) or to ignore it and follow a voluntary decision process (“free-will” condition). Our results show that a well defined component of the intrinsic system—the right inferior parietal cortex—was preferentially activated during the “free-will” condition. Importantly, this activity was significantly higher than the base-line resting state. The results support a self-related role for the intrinsic system and provide clear evidence for both hemispheric and regional specialization in the human intrinsic system.




The Journal of Comparative Neurology (http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/31248/home)

Volume 493 Issue 1 (http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/112136867/issue), Pages 132 - 139
Free will versus survival: Brain systems that underlie intrinsic constraints on behavior
Joseph L. Price *Department of Anatomy & Neurobiology, Washington University, School of Medicine, St. Louis, Missouri 63110
email: Joseph L. Price (pricej@wustl.edu)*Correspondence to Joseph L. Price, Department of Anatomy & Neurobiology, Washington University, School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO 63110
Keywordsamygdala • orbital cortex • medial prefrontal cortex • periaqueductal gray • hypothalamus • fearAbstractThis article discusses the neuroanatomical systems involved in the related functions of fear and discernment of the consequences of one's actions, two internal constraints on free will and action. Both mechanisms are related to a system for control and modulation of visceral function stretching from the spinal cord to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, including the ventral striatum, ventral pallidum, and mediodorsal thalamus, the amygdala, the hypothalamus, the periaqueductal gray (PAG), and the brainstem reticular formation and autonomic nuclei. Reflexes at the lower levels provide rapid visceral and somatic reactions to threatening stimuli, while the PAG and hypothalamus coordinate these to produce more concerted responses. The amygdala interacts with the cortical sensory systems in the assessment of fear-related stimuli and modulates the reflex responses through projections to the hypothalamus and brainstem. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex, especially the http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/giflibrary/12/ldquo.gifmedial prefrontal network,http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/giflibrary/12/rdquo.gif is connected to the amygdala, hypothalamus, and PAG, and allows cortical control over the system in relation to a wider set of emotions. This cortical region is involved both in the assessment of reward and in mood disorders and it plays a central role in the ability to discern the consequences of one's actions and make appropriate behavioral choices. It also forms an interconnected circuit with specific cortical areas in the rostral superior temporal cortex, posterior parahippocampal cortex, and retrosplenial/posterior cingulate cortex. The overall function of this circuit is unclear, but may be involved in introspective monitoring of the individual. J. Comp. Neurol. 493:132-139, 2005. © 2005 Wiley-Liss, Inc.


Volitional control of movement: The physiology of free will☆
Clinical Neurophysiology, Volume 118, Issue 6, Pages 1179-1192
M. Hallett

Abstract

This review deals with the physiology of the initiation of a voluntary movement and the appreciation of whether it is voluntary or not. I argue that free will is not a driving force for movement, but a conscious awareness concerning the nature of the movement. Movement initiation and the perception of willing the movement can be separately manipulated. Movement is generated subconsciously, and the conscious sense of volition comes later, but the exact time of this event is difficult to assess because of the potentially illusory nature of introspection. Neurological disorders of volition are also reviewed. The evidence suggests that movement is initiated in the frontal lobe, particularly the mesial areas, and the sense of volition arises as the result of a corollary discharge likely involving multiple areas with reciprocal connections including those in the parietal lobe and insular cortex.

[Mulder]

I think it is clear that sciebce can address the question iof free will. However, it probabnly requires philosophers to first define what they mean by it. In order to do that, they'd need to study the existing neuroscience! Is that a circular argument?

[Floppit]

Once upon a time the issue of 'mind' was treated as a philosophical one and the connection between mind and brain held under a degree of doubt. I would say that now science has reached a consensus that doesn't favour the dualist position.

If 20 years ago I'd asked the same question about the mind's presence in the brain it may have faced many of the same hurdles, yet if I said today 'scoop my brain out with a warm spoon and my mind will surely follow' there wouldn't be many dissenters here.

Perhaps I am over simplifying the notion of free will in being happy with the above definitions - but I think they are enough to work from, or at least to begin the process of gathering evidence. The notion of free will itself is already actively used in courts of law so evidently I'm not alone in being 'happy enough' with the definition of what it is.

One thing I may have got wrong is the question itself, maybe 'determine' was the wrong word, if I was writing the thread now I would replace it with 'evidence'.

[Dr B]

The place to start here (as far as science is concerned) is the classic study by Libet.

Following on from this check out the more recent stuff by Patrick Haggard.

These studies show that the brain prepares itself for a response - long before the individual is aware of the intention of responding.

A lot has been made about Libet's original study (a lot of which is quite wrong). All he really showed was that conscious awareness of intention does not share the same time course as the underlying neural correlate. It's no mystery but it is a result that has been misunderstood by philosophers and some fringe watchers alike. O0

[Dr B]

Another similar result in recent years relates to vision. Believe it or not, a good deal of visual processing is not for conscious visual perception. It bypasses the perceptual circuit and feeds into other areas (like action / motor processing). You will not be 'aware' of this information - despite the fact it influences your performance and motor preparation.

A good place to read about this is Milner & Goodale's clssic book (circa 1996 i think) the visual brain in action. They report a patient (DF) who had lost a great deal of their perceptual ability (to organise information into coherent percepts) due to carbon monoxide poisoning. However, she could interact with objects, tools etc - even though she could not actually 'see' them in a coherent manner.

This is similar to the libert / Haggard stuff in the sense that the brain is doing a lot more than merely constructing awareness and consciousness and there are multiple pathways for visual processing - not all of which are for explicit perception. While her perceptula system was damaged - the system for action was reasonably in tact and this was the explanation proposed for this.

[lost thought]

Free will.
We are all products of our upbringing, education, books we read and don't forget the ability to use our selves against us by psychics and other crooks.
All we can do is learn to think and consider before leaping to conclusions.
Evolution is not a good designer of brains.
God was a crap workperson and made faulty brains.
People who claim to have free will often have kneejerk reactions based on thier upbringing and etc.
Once you reconise this it should be possible to make a rational decision but unless you have all the facts can you with out bias.
How often have you been told something and reacted without thinking and got yourself all worked up, then felt foolish once the facts where known.
Free Will if only it was true.

[Floppit]

The place to start here (as far as science is concerned) is the classic study by Libet.

Following on from this check out the more recent stuff by Patrick Haggard.

These studies show that the brain prepares itself for a response - long before the individual is aware of the intention of responding.

A lot has been made about Libet's original study (a lot of which is quite wrong). All he really showed was that conscious awareness of intention does not share the same time course as the underlying neural correlate. It's no mystery but it is a result that has been misunderstood by philosophers and some fringe watchers alike. O0

I have a basic awareness of simlilar (maybe the same) studies but I've never read them myself. I did try a test using the subconscious aspect of decision making to test for prejudice and it was an interesting experience! In the latter experiment (it used to be online and I'll try and find it again) prejudice was measured by the errors people made when trying to work quickly. In my case it showed the presence of racial prejudice despite that being completely counter to my conscious belief system. But as someone who has got into more scraps than you can shake a stick at while defending a mixed community, and someone who will tackle racial abuse rather than tolerate it because it's easier, obviously something else kicks in and overides the subconscious racial bias on multiple occasions. Moreover, the prejudice study I've been refering to was created because in tests that are at the conscious, considered level don't show the same level of prejudice. While it could be argued people change they're conscious responses to please others, or because it counters their own beliefs - they still manage to change them. The point I'm trying (badly) to make is that the start of the decsions making process does not always determine the final decision made and for that reason I have never personally believed that showing neural preparation ultimately challenges free will, except our free will over that same preparation. We have mirror neurons that fire when we watch a task being done but we don't always copy the task.

My comp keeps crashing so, annoyingly, I'm going to post this then carry on in another response - 'pologies...

[Floppit]

The link to the Implicit Association Test mentioned above:
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/uk/takeatest.html

I have a background in behaviourism that leaves me with some big challenges to conscious free will though. Because I believe reinforced behaviour increases (a somewhat circular argument as the increase in the behaviour defines the term 'reinforced!), how do I know my own behaviours aren't just the result of previous rewards? It's not a level playing field, some people do get rewarded for what others later will judge as anti-social.

Having said the above, we can reason, we can become aware and at least work to change bad habits, so free will still plays some role even if it is not complete.

I think my baby has just woken up - I've got one more strand to try and butcher so fingers crossed she falls back to sleep after some TLC!

[Dr B]

The notion of prejudice is the experimenters interpretation of a response - and one i often find deeply unconvincing. I would give that some thought.

Behaviourism will give you problems as it only deals (generally speaking) with basic S-R relationships - try coming at the issues more in terms of information processing theory - or as it is now known, cognitive psychology.

I am sure you know all about this - but as my previous posts show - lots of evidence out there about the neural registration of an intended response and the conscious awareness of it. This can also occur for stimuli that the observer was not aware of. In addition, recent evidence suggests that we prime our own responses even when just watching others perform meaningful acts and we have no intention to act ourselves. This is known as the pre-motor theory of visual perception (it's controversial - but lots of people now buy into it).O0

[Floppit]

Ok - baby is awake and bouncing in the door frame! As I have limited time I'm going to come back to your responses DrB - I need to do some reading first methinks and it may be that the 3rd strand of what I was trying to say covers some of what you're talking about anyway. Please don't think it's because I'm ignoring what you've said so far - quite the contrary.

Deciding on culpability is an area where assessment of free will is integral to the process. Two examples come to mind that demonstrate my own way of viweing culpability. For ease sake it's easier to take them as hypothetical, one was from a documentary so I can't reference it and the other from an experienced event so again I can't reference, both involve brain injury/pathology.

I watched a documentary about a man who had sexually abused his daughter or step daughter while a tumour grew in his frontal lobe area. His case gave a classic A-B-A-B design. He did not abuse his daughter before the tumour, once the tumour was treated he stopped the abuse, as the tumour returned he returned to abusing his daughter. I can't remember the outcome of his trial but the documentary was sympathetic to his plea of the behaviour being outside of his control (as was his wife!!). The crux, for me, was that the abuse took place over a number of months each time. During periods of abuse he hid what was happening, he threatened his daughter into silence and managed to leave few enough clues that even the second time around it took a considerable length of time for his behaviour to come to light. His ability to inhibit his sexual behaviour when he wife or anyone else was present, I believe, evidences his ability to inhibit his sexual behaviour, equally that he could do so over several months evidences considerable consistancy in his ability to control himself. Further, I think his ability to manipulate his daughter shows both an intact theory of mind and an understanding of wrong. Needless to say I felt less sympathetic to his cause!

When I think about gathering evidence for the presence of free will my mind wanders back to the above case. I'm not completely confident it really is evidence of free will but I think it may well be.

The second example is almost the opposite of the first. While chatting to a local guy on a sunny tropical beach a fight broke out outside the next hotel. A very large germanic (sounded like german?) guy violently attacked a very slightly built teenager. The attack was horrible and local men piled in to try and stop it, including the guy I had been talking to. When the local man returned, obviously, I asked what it was about. He told me the young lad is wrong in the head, doesn't speak or understand and since he got older masterbates openly around the hotel beaches (he added that local women are never so undressed in public and the lad was a fisherman's son living on the beach next to the hotels). The boy had masterbated over the large guy's girlfriend or wife and she had noticed and raised the alarm. I saw the same young lad doing the same thing a couple more times, sometimes it looked as though he'd made a very basic attempt to hide, but never well - as skinny as he was he still couldn't hide completely behind palm trees! Mostly, people closing their eyes to bright sunlight did more to hide his actions - and the vigilance of other locals! The locals that I spoke to didn't blame the boy, even the hotel guards only shouted at him rather than physically assaulting him. In this situation what swung it for me was that the apparent lack of theory of mind, his inadequate (if any) hiding when hiding would have certainly increased his chances of a successful !*!*.

I did have alot of interest in CBT and at one point REBT both of which I found interesting in terms of an individual's ability to alter behaviours that they at least experience as being out of their control. I'm inclined to believe that education can and does increase levels of free will and exucutive function. I also got very bored with ardant behaviourists refusal to acknowledge cognitive psychology, I agree it is very interesting and worth noting.

Out of interest but somewhat off topic:
On returning from my travels I joined the lonley planet travel forum. A few times you'd get a rant that all sri lankans were perverts, frequently with stories of open masterbation. On each occasion I would ask where they were when it happened and when I did the answer was always Negombo, the stop over beach nearest the only airport where the boy I saw and heard of lived. Maybe coincidence.

[Admin]

It has been found that when we make a decision, it has already been made before it reaches consciousness. And I have seen it written that therefore free will is merely an illusion.

I don't think that's the case - it simply means that the perception of conscious free will may often be illusory. The decisions, even if made non-consciously, are still free will choices as long as they are not in any way pre-determined.

However, I don't know if conscious decision making can overrule an unconscious decision. So if you decide to do something and then 'think better of it' is it (or can it be) a conscious decision rather than another illusory one that was also made non-consciously?

Perhaps inhibition is a good candidate?

When a baby sees a toy across the room and starts crawling towards it but then sees a rattle half way over, they will often have their attention grabbed by the rattle and they completely forget about their original goal.

An older child, however, would be able to inhibit the desire to respond to the new competing stimulus (the rattle). So is the new stimulus grabbing their attention and the urge to attend to it is a non-conscious response but the ability to inhibit this response is a conscious overruling of that urge?

I don't know! But something like that might be a way of determining whether we have free will at a conscious rather than just a non-conscious level.

[SimonC]

Just to throw a slightly different perspective into the discussion - the opposite of 'free will' is sometimes referred to as 'determinism'. This takes the topic into somewhat deeper, more philosophical waters. The idea is that if we accept that our universe started from a state which could theoretically be defined - that every pre-big bang flicker of energy could somehow be charted then, thoretically, it should be possible to predict the course of those constituent parts throughout the evolution of the universe, and thus predetermine the course of universal history.

Think of each subatomic particle as a pool ball, bouncing off the cushions - if we could account for every miniscule bump in the baize, and so on, with unerring accuracy then we could perfectly predict the tragectory of the ball every time.

The determinist position posits that, disregarding any supernatural/divine intervention, the development of the universe from its inception should, in theory at least, be perfectly predictable. That prediction would, of course, include the tragectory of the atoms that make up each one of us. Our lives, thoughts and actions would, therefore, also be absolutely predictable and predetermined by the intitial state of the universe.

Food for thought, eh? :smiley:

[Matt]

Determinism precludes free will, but it is stop possible to have a non-deterministic universe without free will.

[Trinoc]

What if the universe was deterministic, but with infinite (or at least amazingly large) resolution? Then, a bit like Laplace's all-knowing observer, it would be possible in principle to predict the future of the universe if you knew the exact position and velocity of every particle at a given time (I'm ignoring quantum uncertainty here). However, the amount of information needed to predict anything would be so much greater than the amount of information gained from the event itself, that it would be a pointless exercise. In effect, the future is chaotic ... determined in principle, but so sensitive to initial conditions as to be undetermined in any practical sense. No way of prediction would involve processing less information than simply waiting and seeing what happened, except in very limited cases.

[SimonC]

What if the universe was deterministic, but with infinite (or at least amazingly large) resolution? Then, a bit like Laplace's all-knowing observer, it would be possible in principle to predict the future of the universe if you knew the exact position and velocity of every particle at a given time (I'm ignoring quantum uncertainty here). However, the amount of information needed to predict anything would be so much greater than the amount of information gained from the event itself, that it would be a pointless exercise. In effect, the future is chaotic ... determined in principle, but so sensitive to initial conditions as to be undetermined in any practical sense. No way of prediction would involve processing less information than simply waiting and seeing what happened, except in very limited cases.

I agree, of course, that the universe is vastly too complex for us to make any great predictions about. Perhaps, though, it's interesting to turn the question around - what ( if anything ) has intervened between the Big Bang and this very moment to determine the current state of every speck of matter in the universe? If we put aside the idea of outside, supernatural influence, then hasn't it all just unfolded as inevitably determined by the starting point? And doesn't that include all the matter that goes to make us, our brains and thoughts and, therefore, our actions?

I find this question fascinating as it seems to be the ultimate point for the rationalist/materialist outlook. It's hard to argue against ( at least for me ) without introducing some notion of 'soul' or a divine guiding hand. It's also tempting to talk about 'chaos' or 'unpredictability', but this seems to fudge the issue - these things should also be 'part of the system', inevitably determined from the start, not some outside force acting upon the universe.

[Trinoc]

I'm wondering whether there is any essential difference between indeterminacy, and determinacy in which the amount of information needed to determine anything would be greater than the total information capacity of the matter in the universe, possibly infinite.

In other words, given a situation in which the probability is essentially zero of being able to work out the exact initial conditions to result in a given outcome, is it really any different from a situation in which there is no determinism at all?

[SimonC]

I'm wondering whether there is any essential difference between indeterminacy, and determinacy in which the amount of information needed to determine anything would be greater than the total information capacity of the matter in the universe, possibly infinite.

In other words, given a situation in which the probability is essentially zero of being able to work out the exact initial conditions to result in a given outcome, is it really any different from a situation in which there is no determinism at all?

But surely, even if the probability of working out the initial state is zero, that doesn't have any bearing on the course of events that follow that starting point? In other words, even if we can neither predict future events, nor extrapolate all the way back to the beginning, it all still had to unfold inevitably from the start, without outside influence. Maybe??

Forgive me if I'm not being fantastically clear today - had a migraine this morning and still feeling very fuzzy! :-[

[Trinoc]

But surely, even if the probability of working out the initial state is zero, that doesn't have any bearing on the course of events that follow that starting point? In other words, even if we can neither predict future events, nor extrapolate all the way back to the beginning, it all still had to unfold inevitably from the start, without outside influence. Maybe??
This is the problem. It used to be possible to imagine a universe which had a particular state to infinite precision, because we imagined there was an observer capable of infinite precision looking at it (or directing it, if you prefer), i.e. God ... but if we accept that no observer, not even the whole universe itself, is capable of discerning things with infinite precision, is it really meaningful to say that the universe has such a precise state at all?

This is of course without adding in quantum uncertainty, which wrecks the possibility of precision altogether ... but I'm reluctant to put in quantum uncertainty as an initial assumption. Any idea that tries to explain the whole universe should be able to explain quantum uncertainty as well, not simply assume it without explanation. Maybe quantum uncertainty is just the manifestation of chaos at a lower level ... but that would just be speculation.

[SimonC]

This is the problem. It used to be possible to imagine a universe which had a particular state to infinite precision, because we imagined there was an observer capable of infinite precision looking at it (or directing it, if you prefer), i.e. God ... but if we accept that no observer, not even the whole universe itself, is capable of discerning things with infinite precision, is it really meaningful to say that the universe has such a precise state at all?



I'm honestly not sure. When we look at maps of the universe as it is, and we try to extrapolate backwards ( considering red shift and so on ), isn't that exactly what we try to do? To get as close as we can to describing the original starting conditions of the universe? Of course, we will never do that in anything other than a clumsy and very limited way, but isn't there an assumption that it should be possible to achieve that aim?

This is nothing more than speculation on my behalf ( I don't have the science to discuss this in anything other than very broad terms ), and I hope I'm not straying into woo here, but I wonder if the determinist stance is limited by a Newtonian, three-dimensional view of the universe. It's easy to visualise energy/matter flying out from the big bang, and continuing in its inevitable tragectory - subatomic particles forming, matter coalescing and so on. All of that 'stuff' continuing to interact right up to the present moment.

I wonder, however, if the theories about 'higher dimensions' might give a different and more complex persective on all of this? Again, this is just speculation on my part, and I really don't have the knowledge to back up such pondering! :-[

[Trinoc]

To get as close as we can to describing the original starting conditions of the universe?
First we have to decide whether the universe has a unique set of starting conditions, or a unique past at all, of course.

Seems like a suitable time to plug one of my favourite speculative science articles: The Janus-Headed Arrow of Time (http://www.tcpl.org.uk/The%20Janus-Headed%20Arrow%20Of%20Time%202008-10-14.pdf) by Donald Kingsbury. Read it, and see if you find it as difficult to fault the reasoning as I do.

[chaggle]

Is there an "It's all going straight over my head" emoticon? :-[

[SimonC]

First we have to decide whether the universe has a unique set of starting conditions, or a unique past at all, of course.

Seems like a suitable time to plug one of my favourite speculative science articles: The Janus-Headed Arrow of Time (http://www.tcpl.org.uk/The%20Janus-Headed%20Arrow%20Of%20Time%202008-10-14.pdf) by Donald Kingsbury. Read it, and see if you find it as difficult to fault the reasoning as I do.

Thanks for the link Trinoc. Looks like interesting reading! O0

[Question Authority]

The link to the Implicit Association Test mentioned above:
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/uk/takeatest.html




I have taken a couple of these tests several years ago, and just now took a couple of them again (plan to do a few more), but I really have an issue with such an arbitrary testing methodology. Maybe it's just me who's slow on the uptake, lol, but it takes me a while to readjust my thinking when they switch gears and therefore, my responses are slower in the second phase of this testing.

Case in point, I just took the Age test and it's trying to tell me that I have a strong preference for young over old. Couldn't be further from the truth (even when I was a youth myself, I preferred the company and counsel of older people, lol), but the order in which they had the "young/old" and "good/bad" categories would have revealed the exact opposite of the results if it had been switched around. (They explain it has to do not only with errors made - I made a ton of errors after they switched gears - but also the speed with which you respond. I was much slower after they shifted terms because my brain was still geared toward the first set.)

It was also off on the Country preference, saying that I show a slight preference for the US over the UK. Also couldn't be further from the truth, although there's also the whole familiarity thing in addition to changing the order of terms presented. As an American, I'm obviously more familiar with Americana, it can't be helped. But as an Anglophile, I think their conclusion is silly at best, lol.

Since I don't think this is scientifically valid enough to be a good indicator of the various things they're testing, I can't imagine how science could test for free will, especially in light of things already mentioned here such as pre-conditioning.